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ARE POLITICIANS A PROTECTED CLASS?: THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 'REASONABLE ACCESS' MEDIA
RIGHTS UNDER THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT
Matthew W. Daus*
To most Americans, politicians do not qualify as
a protected class. However, due to the constituen-
cies they represent, the candidates' rights may
have an impact on voters' rights. In our media
saturated society, the ability of a candidate for
public office to obtain television or radio access is
often crucial to a campaign's success. Further-
more, a candidate's ability to deliver a message to
American voters through the broadcast media
plays a critical role in the preservation of a free
and democratic society.
Section 312(a) (7) of the Communications Act'
guarantees candidates for federal elected office
the right of "reasonable access" to the broadcast
media. While the federal election law reform was
well intentioned, Congressional exclusion of state
and local candidates to "reasonable access" re-
mains a mystery. Although twenty-five years have
passed since the passage of Section 312 (a) (7), it is
not untimely to pose a constitutional inquiry-
namely, does the distinction drawn between fed-
eral and non-federal candidates under the "rea-
sonable access" rule violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the Constitution? 2 This query is the
subject of this article.
Now is the time to reconsider the Constitu-
tional ramifications drawn between federal and
non-federal political broadcasting. Campaign fi-
nance reform is currently underway and sister
provisions of the Communications Act are pro-
* Matthew W. Daus is Deputy Commissioner for Legal
Affairs and General Counsel at the New York City Taxi &
Limousine Commission. The views expressed in this article
are exclusively those of the author in his private capacity and
do not in any way represent the official views of the City of
New York.
1 47 U.S.C. § 312(a) (7) (1994).
2 Although there is no explicit Equal Protection Clause
in the United States Constitution which applies directly to
the actions of the Federal government, the Due Process
posed for amendment. In the United States Sen-
ate, for instance, campaign finance reform legisla-
tion was introduced in January 1997 by, inter alia,
Senators McCain and Feingold. This legislation
was placed on the Senate calendar in September
1997. 3 A portion of the proposed legislation seeks
to amend Section 315 of the Communications Act
of 1934,4 which would grant candidates to the
United States Senate thirty minutes of free broad-
casting time.5 Although this proposed amend-
ment does not address the "reasonable access"
provisions of Section 312(a) (7) of the Communi-
cations Act, the underlying issue of media access
is addressed with respect only to United States
Senate candidates. Therefore, as related changes
may take place during an upcoming Congres-
sional term, it is timely to raise the Constitutional
issues presented herein.
Section I of this article describes the "reason-
able access" requirement for federal candidates
under Section 312(a) (7) of the Communications
Act, as interpreted by the courts and the Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC"). Section
II examines the case law progression applicable to
voter and candidate rights under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of
the United States Constitution, and identifies the
appropriate standard of constitutional review.
Section III analyzes the constitutionality of the
"reasonable access" rule's exclusive applicability
Clause of the Fifth Amendment has been held to incorporate
an Equal Protection component which is identical to the
standards that apply to state action under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Weinberger
v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638, n.2 (1975); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976); United States v. Paradise, 480
U.S. 149, 166, n.16 (1987).
3 See S. 25, 105th Cong. (1997).
4 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1994).
5 See S. 25, 105th Cong. § 102 (1997).
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to federal candidates in light of proffered govern-
mental objectives and legislative intent.
1. A FEDERAL CANDIDATE'S RIGHT OF
REASONABLE ACCESS TO THE
BROADCAST MEDIA
Section 312(a) (7) of the Communications Act
provides that a broadcasting station's license may
be revoked for "willful or repeated failure to allow
reasonable access to or to permit purchase of rea-
sonable amounts of time for the use of a broad-
casting station by a legally qualified candidate for
Federal elective office on behalf of his candi-
dacy. "6
In CBS, Inc. v. FCC.,7 the United States Supreme
Court addressed the issue of whether Section
312(a) (7) created an affirmative individual right
of media access or merely codified the pre-ex-
isting general public interest standard applicable
to all political broadcasts.8 In 1979, the Carter-
Mondale Presidential Committee requested televi-
sion access on specific dates and programming
times. 9 The Committee wanted to broadcast a for-
mal announcement of President Carter's candi-
dacy, which included a documentary describing
his administration's record.1' Petitioner CBS re-
fused to make all the requested times available
due to the large number of Presidential candi-
dates and the potential programming disruption
that might ensue."
The Supreme Court held that Section
312(a) (7) gives rise to a "personal right of access"
by "focus[ing] on the individual 'legally qualified
candidate' seeking air time to advocate 'his candi-
dacy,' and guarantees him 'reasonable access' en-
forceable by specific governmental sanction."'
12
The Court further declared that "[i]t is clear on
the face of the statute that Congress did not pre-
scribe merely a general duty to afford some mea-
6 47 U.S.C. § 312(a) (7) (1994).
7 CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981).
8 See id. at 376-377.
9 See id. at 372-373.
1o Id.
It See id. at 372.
12 Id. at 377-379.
13 Id. at 377-378.
14 Id. at 379, n.6; citing Public Notice: The Law of Political
Broadcasting and Cablecasting, 69 F.C.C. 2d 2209, 2290 (1978)
"1978 Primer."
15 Id. at 378.
16 100 F.C.C. 2d at 1525-26 (1984).
sure of political programming, which the public
interest obligation of broadcasters already pro-
vided for." '
3
Furthermore, the Court touched upon the dis-
tinction between federal, state and local candi-
dates for office. In a footnote, the Court elabo-
rated on its holding and stated, "[t]he public
interest requirement still governs the obligations
of broadcasters with respect to political races at
the state and local levels."'14 This language put
state and local candidates subject to the pre-19 7 1
public interest standard requiring stations to
make "reasonable good faith judgments about the
importance of particular races."'
5
In its 1984 Primer, the FCC described briefly
the obligations created by Section 312(a) (7) with
respect to state and local candidates:
[T]he law does not require stations to provide access to
every state, county, and local candidate. However, the
Commission, the courts, and Congress have recognized
that political broadcasting is one of the most important
services that a station can provide to the public. There-
fore, stations are expected to allocate reasonable
amounts of time to other political races, based on the
licensee's judgment of the importance of the races and
the amount of public interest in them.
16
Such language appears to apply the general pub-
lic interest standard to a state or local candidate's
request for media access.' 7  Furthermore, the
analysis of the 1984 Primer appears to be a reac-
tion to the Supreme Court's decision in CBS.
The FCC revised its rules pertaining to political
broadcasting in 1992.18 After the public com-
ment period, the Commission addressed the issue
of media access by state and local candidates. 19
Bound considerably by the unequivocal language
in Section 312(a) (7), which specifically applies
reasonable access rights to federal candidates, the
Commission decided as follows:
The Commission will not reqtire a specific right of ac-
cess for non-federal candidates. Section 312(a) (7), the
only access provision in the political broadcasting laws,
17 Political broadcasting is one of the fourteen elements
that must be covered in order for a broadcast licensee to
meet the "public interest" requirements in addressing the
"needs and desires of the community." See Report and Order:
Commission Policy in Enforcing Section 312(a)(7) of the Communi-
cations Act, 68 F.C.C. 2d 1079, 1087-1088 (1978).
18 See generally 47 C.F.R. Parts 73 and 76, 57 Fed. Reg. 189
(Jan. 3, 1992).
19 Radio Broadcast and Television Broadcast Services,
Cable Television Service; Codification of the Commission's
Political Programming Policies, 57 Fed. Reg. 189, 192 (1992)
(to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 73 and 76).
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is quite explicit in creating a right of "reasonable ac-
cess" exclusively for federal candidates. Thus, no statu-
tory basis exists to create a right which Congress implic-
itly rejected.
2z
Although it is clear that both Congress and the
FCC mandate that individual access rights under
Section 312(a) (7) apply only to federal candi-
dates, the rationale for this limitation is not appar-
ent from the face of the statute and regulations
alone.
The legislative history surrounding the enact-
ment of Section 312(a) (7) does not provide a
clear justification for limiting media access rights
to federal candidates. Section 312(a) (7) was en-
acted as part of the Federal Election Campaign
Act of 1971.21 The initial House drafting did not
contain what later became Section 312(a)(7).22
Section 312(a) (7) was added to the Senate ver-
sion of the bill and initially applied to "any legally
qualified candidate" - whether federal, state or
local. 23 However, the applicability of Section
312(a) (7) was narrowed by the Joint Conference
Committee, which expressly limited its provisions
to federal candidates.
24
II. THE APPLICABLE LEVEL OF EQUAL
PROTECTION SCRUTINY
The first step in analyzing whether Section
20 See id.
21 See Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972).
22 See H.R. REP. Nos. 92-564 & 92-565 (1971), reprinted in
117 CONG. REc. 43417-22 (1971).
23 S. Conf. Rep. No. 92-580, at 22 (1971).
24 Id.; see also H. CONF. REP. No. 92-752, at 22 [hereinaf-
ter H. CONF. REP. No. 92-752] (1971).
25 See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 16-17 (1973).
26 Eide v. Sarasota County, 908 F.2d 716, 722 (11th Cir.
1990). See also Fry v. City of Hayward, 701 F. Supp. 179, 181
(N.D. Cal. 1988). "Unless a statute distinguishes on the basis
of a suspect or a quasi-suspect classification, or burdens fun-
damental rights, then it will be presumed valid and sustained
against an equal protection challenge if 'the classification
drawn is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.'" See
id. at 179. Property owner claimed that a land use measure
precluding him from obtaining a change in her property's
zoning designation without prior approval involved neither a
suspect class, nor a fundamental right, and consequently, the
Court applied a rational basis standard. See id. at 181.
27 Chandler v. Georgia Public Telecommunications
Commission, 917 F.2d 486 (11th Cir. 1990).
28 See id. at 489. Although Chandler involved Section
315 of the Communications Act, its Equal Protection analysis
is the same as that applied to Section 312(a)(7). Chandler
involved attempts by the Libertarian Party's candidates for
governor and lieutenant governor to enjoin televised polit-
ical debates between the Democratic and Republican candi-
312(a) (7) violates the Equal Protection Clause is
to determine the applicable level of judicial scru-
tiny. If a law discriminates unequally against a sus-
pect or protected class or involves a fundamental
right, it is subject to strict judicial scrutiny.
25
However, if a law draws a distinction between per-
sons who do not belong to a protected class and
does not involve a fundamental right, the law will
pass constitutional muster if it is "rationally re-
lated to a legitimate government purpose.
'26
The distinction drawn in Section 312(a) (7) is
between federal, and state or local candidates for
public office. In Chandler v. Georgia Public Telecom-
munications Commission,27 the Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit held that candidates for pub-
lic office are not members of a protected class and
that only a rational basis analysis is necessary for
Equal Protection purposes. 28 However, when the
rights of candidates are restricted, the rights of
voters are indirectly affected. Because voting is a
fundamental right 29 which ordinarily triggers
close judicial scrutiny, questions arise concerning
the nexus between the rights of candidates and
voters.
30
In Bullock v. Carter,31 the Supreme Court held
that a Texas primary election filing-fee system
contravened the Fourteenth Amendment Equal
dates for those offices, unless they were also included as par-
ticipants. See id. at 488. The court held that the decision of a
public television station to limit the number of participants
in a televised political debate was rationally related to the
programmer's undertaking to provide an educational pro-
gram of sufficient interest to attract interested viewers, and
that such a decision is for the programmers to decide. See id.
The court declined to set a precedent that would require
public television stations to forego the. broadcast of impor-
tant public issues by all "serious" candidates in order to pro-
vide a public forum to any candidate that obtained a ballot
position. See id.
29 The United States Supreme Court considers the polit-
ical franchise of voting to be a fundamental political right
because it is "preservative of all rights." See Yick Wo v. Hop-
kins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (holding that a municipal ordinance
regulating public laundries within the limits of a municipal-
ity, in this case San Francisco, violates the principles of the
Constitution, if it confers upon the municipal authorities ar-
bitrary powers to make unjust discriminations founded on
classifications based on race). The guarantee of protection
contained in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States extends to all persons within the territo-
rial jurisdiction of the United States, without regard to differ-
ences of race, color, or nationality. See id. at 356.
30 See infra note 37 and accompanying text.
31 Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972) (holding that a
state statute that imposes fees of such magnitude that numer-
ous qualified candidates are precluded from running in an
1998]
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Protection Clause. 32 The Texas statute at issue re-
quired candidates for public office to pay a filing
fee in order to be placed on the ballot for primary
elections. 33  The Court determined the "thresh-
old question" to be whether the appropriate stan-
dard ofjudicial review of the Texas statute was "ra-
tional' basis. . .or a more rigid standard of
review."
3 4
The Court in Bullock recognized that because
fundamental right status had not been afforded to
"candidacy" in general, that "a rigorous standard
of review" would not be invoked.35 The Bullock
Court cited to Harper v. Virginia Board of Elec-
tions,36 in which the Court invoked a strict stan-
dard of review to find an annual poll tax on resi-
dents over the age of twenty-one to be a denial of
Equal Protection. The Bullock Court, however,
found the facts were distinguishable, yet applied
the reasoning of Harper to formulate its own stan-
dard of review.
Essential to an understanding of both Harper
and Bullock is the distinction between candidates
and voters. Harperwas based on the constitutional
rights of voters, not candidates. Bullock, however,
pointed out that the rights of candidates and vot-
ers are not easily separated from either a theoreti-
cal or a correlative standpoint.37 Hence, the Bul-
lock Court declared that "[i]n approaching
candidate restrictions, it is essential to examine in
a realistic light the extent and nature of their im-
pact on voters."
38
Candidates were not afforded fundamental
right status by the Bullock decision. However, the
Court intimated that, if an infringement on candi-
dates' rights has more than an incidental or mini-
mal impact on the rights of voters, then strict scru-
tiny may apply. The Bullock Court clarified the
standard of scrutiny as follows:
election must be closely scrutinized and can be sustained
only if it is reasonably necessary to accomplish a legitimate
state objective, and not merely because it has some rational
basis).
32 See id. at 134. Appellees seeking candidacy for local
office in the Texas Democratic Primary Election challenged
the validity of the statutory scheme which required payment
of fees as high as $ 8,900. See id. Appellees asserted they
were unable to pay the required fees and were therefore
barred from running. See id. The Court held that, although
a state has an interest in regulating the number of candidates
on a ballot and eliminating those that are spurious, it cannot
attain these objectives by arbitrary means such as those called
for by the Texas statute which eliminates potential candi-
dates who cannot afford filing fees. See id.
33 See id. at 135.
Because the Texas filing-fee scheme has a real and ap-
preciable impact on the exercise of the franchise, and
because this impact is related to the resources of the
voters supporting a particular candidate, we conclude,
as in Harper, that the laws must be "closely scrutinized"
and found reasonably necessary to the accomplishment
of legitimate state objectives in order to pass constitu-
tional muster.
39
The effect of the Texas filing-fee on voters was
"neither incidental nor remote," as the electo-
rate's choice in less affluent communities would
be more heavily affected due to their candidates'
inability to pay.40 Instead of merely demonstrat-
ing a "rational basis" for the filing-fee system, the
Bullock court required a showing of "reasonable
necessity." 4 1 In both Harper and Bullock, the rela-
tionship between wealth and voting rights was a
vital factor in not only the outcome of the case,
but in justifying the applicable standard of review.
For example, the Court elaborated in Harper that
"wealth, like race, creed, or color, is not germane
to one's ability to participate in the electoral pro-
cess." 42 The Harper Court then proceeded to
"closely scrutinize" the poll tax law, declaring it
unconstitutional because "wealth or fee paying
has. . .no relation to voting qualifications [and]
the right to vote is too precious, too fundamental
to be so burdened or conditioned."4
3
In 1974, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit interpreted the Bullock standard in Paulsen v.
FCC44. A petition was filed to review an FCC rul-
ing by entertainer Pat Paulsen, who declared his
candidacy for the Republican nomination for
President in 1972.45 Since Walt Disney planned
to air a television series starring Pat Paulsen dur-
ing the campaign, a declaratory ruling was sought
from the FCC as to whether television stations
that broadcast the series must provide "equal op-
portunities" to other candidates for television
34 Id. at 142.
'5 See id. at 142-143.
36 Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663
(1966).
37 See Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S 134 at 143.
38 Id.
39 See id. at 144.
40 See id. at 143-144.
41 See id. at 144.
42 See Harper, 383 U.S. at 667.
43 Id. at 670. Justice Harlan joined in a dissent with Jus-
tice Stewart, disagreeing primarily with the majority's applica-
tion of strict scrutiny. See id. at 681. Instead, the dissenters
favored the application of a rational basis test. See id.
44 Paulsen v. FCC, 491 F.2d 887 (9th Cir. 1974).
45 See id. at 888-889.
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time pursuant to Section 315 of the Communica-
tions Act of 1934.46 The FCC found that "any na-
tional television appearances by Paulsen would
impose equal opportunities obligations upon
broadcast licensees.
'" 4 7
On appeal, Paulsen argued that the FCC ruling
was an unconstitutional denial of equal protec-
tion because he was compelled to abandon his
employment and livelihood in order to run for
public office while other candidates were not simi-
larly burdened.4 Paulsen relied on Bullock, con-
tending that the FCC ruling "falls with unequal
weight - on performers not wealthy enough to
stop working during their campaigns.."49 The
Paulsen court held that:
In Bullock the Court applied neither a compelling state
interest test nor a rational basis test. Rather it required
that, upon 'close scrutiny,' the Texas filing-fee system
be 'reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of le-
gitimate state objectives.' Texas maintained that the
fees were necessary to regulate the primary ballot and
to finance elections. The Court found, though, that
the fees served no rational regulatory purpose and that
the state interest in saving election costs did notjustify a
system that excluded poorer candidates unable to pay
the fees. We find that Section 315 as interpreted by the
FCC, on the other hand, is both reasonable and neces-
sary to achieve the important and legitimate objectives
of encouraging political discussion and preventing un-
fair and unequal use of the broadcast media. The sec-
tion therefore passes constitutional muster.
50
The Ninth Circuit in Paulsen interpreted the
Bullock test to involve a middle level scrutiny,
somewhere between strict scrutiny and rational
basis review. In 1974, the Paulsen decision was ap-
plied by the District Court for the District of Ver-
mont in Morrisseau v. Mt. Mansfield Television,
Inc.51 In Morrisseau, pro se plaintiff Dennis Morris-
seau contended that defendant WCAX-TV was re-
quired to provide him free time as a candidate for
office because, unlike his opponents, he was un-
able to pay for advertising on the station.52 Mor-
risseau's action was based on the equal time provi-
sions of the Communications Act, namely
Sections 312(a)(7) and 315.
53
Morrisseau argued that the equal time provi-
46 See id. at 889. Section 315(a) provides in pertinent
part: "[i]f any licensee shall permit any person who is a le-
gally qualified candidate for any public office to use a broad-
casting station, he shall afford equal opportunities to all
other such candidates for that office in the use of such broad-
casting station . . ." 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1994).
47 Paulsen, 491 F.2d at 889.
48 See id. at 891-892.
49 Id. at 892.
50 Id. (citation omitted).
sions of the Communications Act were unconsti-
tutional. The District Court in Morrisseau, relying
on Paulsen, rejected plaintiffs equal protection
claim for the same reasons that the FCC ruling
was upheld in Paulsen54 and chose not to elabo-
rate on the issue. Therefore, as a result of the
holding in Morrisseau, for constitutional purposes,
the same standard of Equal Protection review in
Bullock appears to apply to both Section 312(a) (7)
(the "reasonable access" rule) and Section 315
(the "equal opportunities" rule) of the Communi-
cations Act.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
SECTION 312(a) (7)
A. The Legislative Intent of Section 312(a) (7)
The legislative history of Section 312(a) (7) pro-
vides no clear explanation for its exclusive appli-
cation of reasonable access rights to candidates
for federal elective office. However, a few justifi-
cations can be proffered to explain the basis for
drawing the federal/non-federal distinction.
1. Saturation of the Broadcast Media
The most compelling justification for limiting
the "reasonable access" requirement to federal
candidates may be to prevent the saturation of
broadcast programming during the election sea-
son.55 There are certainly less federal candidates
than the number of state and local candidates
who could conceivably inundate the broadcast
media with their "reasonable access" requests. 56
In fact, the likelihood that state or local candi-
dates may successfully access the broadcast media
under the general public interest standard may be
seriously diminished by the exercise of federal
candidates' "reasonable access" rights. Federal
candidates who exercise Section 312(a) (7) rights
might absorb most of the broadcasting time dur-
51 Morriseau v. Mt. Mansfield Television, Inc., 380 F.
Supp. 512 (D. Vt. 1974).
52 See id. at 514.
53 See id. at 513.
54 See id. at 516.
55 Cf Chris T. Kako, Note, The Right of "Reasonable Access"
for Federal Political Candidates Under Section 312(a)(7) of the Com-





ing an election season which may, depending on
the state, coincide with state and local elections.
2. The Constitutional Authority for Congress'
Enactment of the Federal Election Campaign Act
Congress' decision to limit the "reasonable ac-
cess" rule to federal candidates was part of an
election reform package which included the en-
actment of Section 312(a) (7) as part of the Fed-
eral Election Campaign Act of 1971. The goal of
this legislation was to reform federal election law.
Amending the access and political advertising
provisions of the Communications Act was not the
sole purpose for the enactment of the Federal
Election Campaign Act. Rather, the goal of pro-
moting fairness in federal elections (not state or
local elections), appears to be the dominant
theme.
Due to the nature of campaign reform legisla-
tion, Congress' constitutional authority to act ap-
pears to be based primarily upon its right to regu-
late federal elections57 rather than its power to
regulate interstate commerce. 58 Congress may
have exercised caution and deference by not in-
terfering -with the sovereign rights of states and
their municipalities in enacting laws regulating
state and local elections. 59 However, Congres-
sional authority to enact laws regulating the
broadcast industry is derived from the Commerce
Clause of the Constitution.60 Federal broadcast-
ing laws preempt any and all state broadcasting
regulations as a consequence of the Constitution's
Supremacy Clause.
61
3. The Effectiveness of the Media in Federal
Campaigns
Because national and statewide campaigns are
enormous undertakings, the role of the media is
crucial to their success." 2 However, the broadcast
media may not be the most effective method for a
local candidate to deliver his or her campaign
message.6 3 Due to the grass roots nature of local
campaigns, many local candidates may find it
more effective to utilize other methods of commu-
nication, such as the distribution of campaign
literature or use of the print media, rather than
the more costly broadcast media.
Congress may have considered federal candi-
dates to be more reliant upon the broadcast me-
dia for campaign communication than state and
local candidates due to the enhanced size and vol-
ume of Congressional Districts as compared to
most state and local election districts. Accord-
ingly, Congress may have found federal cam-
paigns to be in greater need of "reasonable ac-
cess" to the broadcast media in order to effectively
communicate campaign messages to voters, than
state or local candidates. Despite this proposed
rationale for a federal/non-federal distinction, no
reference exists in the legislative history of Sec-
tion 312(a) (7) to justify this theory.
64
57 See U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 4 (stating that "[t]he Times,
Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and
Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Leg-
islature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law
make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of
chusing [sic] Senators.").
58 See Kako, supra note 55, at 1302-1303, n.89.
59 The Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion provides that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S.
CoN sT. amend. X. It is self-evident that States have the sover-
eign right, in accordance with their Police Power, to regulate
the time, manner and place of elections for State and Local
office. However, such State rights must give way where a su-
perseding Federal constitutional right or federal law
preempts such rights under the Supremacy Clause.
60) See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 ("Congress shall have the
Power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the several
States ...").
h1 The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitu-
tion states that "This Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
6 , See KATHLEEN HALL JAMFISON, PACKAGING THE PRESI-
DENCN 487 (3d ed. 1996). See also DARNELL M. WEST, AIR
WARS 1 (2d ed. 1997) [hereinafter WEST].
6" See WEST, at 1 (explaining that in 1996, Steve Forbes
and Bob Dole both spent over $30 million in advertising).
64 See Pub. L. No. 92-225, 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1773 (vol.
2), 1787, 1792, 1828, 1867.
[Vol. 6
Are Politicians a Protected Class?
B. The Augmented Equal Protection Standard
of Bullock v. Carter
1. The Nexus Between Local Candidate and Voter
Under Bullock, when examining the constitu-
tionality of candidate restrictions, it is essential to
analyze "the extent and nature of their impact on
voters."6 5 By its limitation to federal candidates,
the "reasonable access" requirement of Section
312(a) (7) may impact upon voter decision-mak-
ing by denying them information concerning
state and local candidates via the broadcast media
during election season.
In Presidential, Senatorial and House of Repre-
sentative elections, advertisement via television
and radio is the primary method of communicat-
ing a candidate's message to voters. 66 Often, vast
amounts of campaign funds are expended on
political advertising in elections where voters
must be reached over wide geographical areas.
67
One may contend that the federal/non-federal
distinction is justified in that the offices of Presi-
dent, Senate and U.S. Representative are more
significant and influential than some state and all
local offices due to the enhanced size of the vot-
ing pool which elects these federal officials. How-
ever, some statewide offices such as governor,
state comptroller, state attorney general and
mayor of a large city represent more voters than
all or many Congressional districts. For instance,
there may be a more compelling need for state-
wide gubernatorial candidates to deliver a
message to voters, because decisions made by this
office impact the everyday lives of the citizens of
the entire state, perhaps more so than a local fed-
eral elected official.6
8
However, the delivery of most government serv-
ices occurs through state and local govern-
65 See Bullock, 405 U.S. at 143.
66 See generally Russel J. Davis, Political Candidate's Right to
Equal Broadcast Time Under 47 U.S.C. § 315, 35 A.L.R. 856
(1977).
67 See id. at 887.
68 One could also contend that the federal/non-federal
distinction is justified because federal law is supreme, and
that federal issues are of greater importance for political
broadcasting purposes.
69 See generally Board of Assessment Appeals v. AM/FM
International, 940 P.2d 338 (Colo. 1997).
70 See id. at 345.
71 Id.
72 See Tornillo v. Miami Herald Publ'g. Co., 287 So. 2d
78, 87 (1974).
ments. 69 The everyday problems of voters are ad-
dressed primarily through state and local
legislatures. Many local government agencies,
such as the Departments of Health, Sanitation,
Transportation, Fire, Police, Social Services and
Zoning Boards, deal directly with essential govern-
mental functions.7 0 State and local legislators are
entrusted with and held accountable by their con-
stituents for the delivery of quality government
services through such entities. 7 1 Issues which
such officials address can spark intense local pub-
lic interest in terms of political broadcasting.
72
The broadcast media could have a powerful im-
pact upon the dissemination of information that
can'influence the result of an election.7 3 Hence,
increased broadcast media access for federal can-
didates empowers voters by providing them with
information that can both influence their voting
decisions, and prompt them to make a trip to the
voting booth when they otherwise might not.
7 4
Because state and local candidates are important
to the electorate, the rights of voters are affected
when greater broadcast media exposure is pro-
vided to federal candidates, but not to local candi-
dates.
The media has such an important influence
upon voters, 75 and therefore, a clear and suffi-
cient link exists between the rights of citizens to
vote and a candidate's right to media access. Ac-
cordingly, the Bullock standard of "reasonable ne-
cessity" should be applied to an Equal Protection
analysis of Section 312(a)(7). Given the obvious
governmental objective of promoting equality in
federal elections, 76 Congressional exclusion of
state and local candidates from the "reasonable
access" provisions appears unnecessary. Even if
one were to contend that only federal election re-
form was the intent of this law, Congress' exclu-
73 See generally Schacter, infra note 75 and accompanying
text.
74 See id.
75 SeeJane S. Schacter, The Pursuit of "Popular Intent": In-
terpretive Dilemmas in Direct Democracy, 105 YALE L.J. 107, 131
(1995) [hereinafter Schacter] (stating that the "most com-
prehensive studies of voter behavior in ballot campaigns
demonstrate that media communications and political adver-
tising are the most important sources shaping how voters un-
derstand the initiative proposals on which they are asked to
vote.") See alsoJack Winsbro, Misrepresentation in Political Ad-
vertising: The Role of Legal Sanctions, 36 EMORY L.J. 853, 859-
860 (1987).
76 See H. CONF. RP. No. 92-752, supra note 24, at 22.
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sive legislative authority conferred by the Com-
merce Clause 77 to regulate all broadcasting in the
United States imposes an obligation and responsi-
bility to ensure the rights of all candidates and
voters are protected equally. By leveling the play-
ing field among federal candidates, Congress has
effectively locked out state and local candidates
from the field itself. Conceivably, state and local
candidates could be unable to receive "reasonable
access" even under the general public interest
standard, because the federal candidate may util-
ize most of a licensee's broadcasting time.
It is important to clarify the distinction between
the holding in Paulsen and the result proposed by
this article. In Paulsen, the Ninth Circuit upheld
the constitutionality of Section 315(a) of the
Communications Act - which affords all candi-
dates (federal, state and local) with "equal oppor-
tunities" to use a licensee's broadcasting station if
access is granted to another candidate for the
same public office. 78 The overall purpose of both
the "equal opportunities" and "reasonable access"
provisions, which were enacted simultaneously as
part of the Federal Election Campaign Act, was to
"encourag[e] political discussion and pre-
vent. . .unfair and unequal use of the broadcast
media."79 Although such purposes were fur-
thered by the Section 315(a) requirement that all
candidates be afforded "equal opportunities, '"' 0
Section 312(a)(7)'s exclusion of state and local
candidates belies entirely the very basic and legiti-
mate governmental objective of encouraging
political discussion and preventing unequal use of
the broadcast media.
Any broadcast media congestion,- caused by the
"reasonable access" requests of federal candidates,
may deny equal use of the broadcast spectrum to
state and local candidates. Section 312(a)(7), as
written, could be inherently unfair in its applica-
tion. Political discussion concerning issues
presented to voters by state and local candidates
through the broadcast media can be either pre-
cluded or discouraged - again due to federal
77 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
78 See 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1994).
79 See Paulsen, 491 F.2d at 889; see also S. REP. No. 96, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1971); S. REP. No. 229, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. 56 (1971) (stating that Title I of the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971 will "give candidates for public office
greater access to the media so that they may better explain
their stand on the issues, and thereby more fully and com-
pletely inform the voters.").
candidates' consumption of broadcast time under
Section 312(a) (7), which may afford state and lo-
cal candidates minimal public interest broadcast-
ing time on state and local issues that are often of
greater interest and import to voters.
2. The Relationship Between Wealth and
"Reasonable Access"
In Bullock, the Supreme Court emphasized that
a candidate's inability to pay filing fees Would
have an impact upon the rights of voters in less
affluent communities s. 8  The Bullock Court struck
down the Texas filing fee law on Equal Protection
grounds for that reason.8 2 In Harper, a poll tax
law was declared unconstitutional because it made
the fundamental right to vote contingent upon
wealth or the ability to pay a fee.
8 3
Both the Harper and Bullock decisions involve
election laws which, on their face, link a candi-
date's wealth or ability to pay to a burden upon
the fundamental right to vote.8 4 Filing fees and
poll taxes are blatant wealth-based restrictions. 85
Although the plain language of Section 312(a) (7)
does not raise any recognizable wealth based dis-
tinctions, the "reasonable access" provision raises
such concerns in its application.8 6
Certainly, many incumbent federal candidates
possess sufficient resources and funds to finance
their re-election campaigns. To be competitive,
candidates who seek to challenge an incumbent
federal candidate must be well financed in order
to carry on a meaningful campaign. Incumbent
federal candidates often have the luxury of Polit-
ical Action Committee "PAC" and special interest
group funds at their fingertips. Unlike most fed-
eral officials, many local and state incumbent may
not be able to raise the same level of funding -
with the exception of statewide office. The ineq-
uity of applying the "reasonable access" law to
only federal candidates is evident. The "reason-
able access" requirement does level the playing
field between federal candidates, yet by doing so,
80 See Paulsen, 491 F.2d at 889.
81 See Bullock, 405 U.S. at 143-144.
1"2 See id. at 149.
.3 See Harper, 383 U.S. at 670.
84 See generally Harper, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Bullock, 405
U.S. 134 (1972).
85 See generally, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
86 47 U.S.C. § 312(a) (7) (1994).
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state and local candidates are disadvantaged be-
cause they may be more likely to encounter diffi-
culty in accessing the media. Federal candidates,
who can otherwise afford alternative means of
campaign communication can over-saturate a sta-
tion's broadcast time to the exclusion of state and
local candidates. Because federal candidates may
possess greater fundraising potential than many
state or local candidates, federal reasonable access
rights may further elevate the wealth-based dis-
tinction between federal and state or local candi-
dates. Indirectly, this disparity in campaign fund-
ing can adversely impact the voting franchise.
C. Rational Basis Analysis
Even if the heightened judicial scrutiny of Bul-
lock were not applied to the constitutional analysis
of Section 312(a)(7), the distinction drawn be-
tween federal and non-federal candidates may not
survive an ordinary "rational basis" review.
8 7
Under any conceivable rationale for the federally
favored "reasonable access" rights created by Con-
gress, the statute fails on Equal Protection
grounds.""
Likewise, if Congress limited "reasonable ac-
cess" rights to federal candidates because it feared
saturation of the media with requests from nu-
merous state and local candidates, the distinction
must fail.89 Given the legitimate governmental in-
terest in encouraging political discussion and
preventing unfair and unequal use of the broad-
cast media,90 the overwhelming importance of
statewide office and local elected office must have
been ignored or disregarded.
Overall, there are more state and local elected
positions than federal elective offices. Yet, the
question remains: why were only federal candi-
dates granted reasonable access rights? Was it be-
cause Congress drafted legislation to favor its own
87 Eide v. Sarasota County, 908 F.2d 716, 722 (1 1th Cir.
1990). See also Fry v. City of Hayward, 701 F. Supp. 179, 181
(N.D. Cal. 1988). "Unless a statute distinguishes on the basis
of a suspect or a quasi-suspect classification, or burdens fun-
damental rights, then it will be presumed valid and sustained
against an equal protection challenge if 'the classification
drawn is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.'" See
id. at 179. Property owner claimed that a land use measure
precluding him from obtaining a change in her property's
zoning designation without prior approval involved neither a
suspect class, nor a fundamental right, and consequently, the
Court applied a rational basis standard. See id. at 181.
88 See generally Bullock, 405 U.S. 134 (1972) (rejecting
Texas filing-fee system that served no rational regulatory pur-
interests? Was it because federal legislation is
viewed as more important and newsworthy than
state and local legislation? Certainly, the argu-
ment that Section 312(a)(7) was part of federal
campaign election reform and not state or local
reform must also fail as Congress should not dis-
regard its Commerce Clause obligations under
the Constitution.9' By virtue of the Commerce
Clause, Congress is responsible for legislation af-
fecting the entire broadcast spectrum.92 Without
question, even if Congress' legislative purpose was
to enact a comprehensive package of federal elec-
tion reform, should it have included the broad-
casting implications of the "reasonable access"
rule. If this was an intended oversight, then there
certainly is no rational basis for the federal/non-
federal distinction.
It does not appear rational to draw a federal/
non-federal distinction, as this may raise an infer-
ence that federal matters are more important
than state or local matters. This decision should
be left to the voters. The "reasonable access" doc-
trine, if equally applied to all candidates, may im-
pose an undue burden on the broadcasting indus-
try. However, if a more careful limitation were
drafted, this burden may not exist. For instance,
the "reasonable access" rule could have been lim-
ited to campaigns in which the media is a particu-
larly important influence on the outcome of an
election, such as the offices of President, United
States Senate, Governor, State Comptroller, State
Attorney General or any other statewide election.
A limitation in this manner would have been ra-
tional. However, including Congressional elec-
tions and not statewide positions appears arbi-
trary. The Congressional objective should have
been to level the playing field for all candidates
where the media plays an important role in the
outcome of an election; not just to foster equality
among federal candidates.
93
pose and excluded poorer candidates unable to pay the fee.)
89 See Bullock, 405 U.S. at 145 (recognizing that state has
legitimate interest in avoiding overcrowded ballots).
90 See Paulsen v. F.C.C., 491 F.2d 887, at 889 (1974).
91 See U.S. CONST. art I, §8 ("Congress shall have the
Power. . . [t]o regulate Commerce. . .among the several
States...").
92 See id.
93 See PAUL TAYLOR, SEE How THEY RUN, 268-280 (1990).
Taylor supports a "five-minute fix" wherein political parties,
not candidates, would receive free broadcast time similar to
the "party political broadcasts" employed in the British sys-
tem. Id. at 271-272. Regarding the unfeasibility of providing
media access for all candidates. See id. at 276-277. Taylor
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While Congress should not make the determi-
nation that federal policy is more important than
state policy, it would be permissible, in determin-
ing the overall fairness of broadcast media use, for
Congress to decide whether the broadcast media
is a more important influence on the exercise of
voters' rights in certain types of elections. 94 An
analysis of this type could be based upon factors
including the number of registered voters, the ge-
ographical terrain of the district, the functions
and duties of the elected office, in addition to
whether broadcast saturation would cause an un-
due burden upon the broadcast media.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Congressional rationale for limiting "rea-
sonable access" broadcast media rights to federal
candidates remains a mystery. As demonstrated
herein, any conceivable justification for excluding
state and local candidates from the ambit of Sec-
tion 312(a)(7) of the Communications Act'
-15
would not pass constitutional muster under either
Equal Protection standard: (1) the heightened
scrutiny test under Bullock and its progeny; or (2)
the rational basis test. 96
Due to the inequities presented by Section
312(a) (7), Congress should consider amending
the "reasonable access" rule to include state and
local candidates.97 However, it may not be feasi-
ble for any and all candidates to be covered by
Section 312(a)(7). 9 1 Accordingly, Congress
should investigate whether a burden would be im-
posed upon the broadcast media by extending the
application of "reasonable access" rights to all fed-
eral and non-federal candidates. If the findings
reveal that a significant burden would result, Sec-
tion 312(a) (7) should be repealed. Certainly, the
more logical result would be to amend Section
312(a) (7) and limit the scope of "reasonable ac-
cess" rights to nationwide and certain statewide
would not guarantee access to every candidate (or any candi-
date) but instead would allocate broadcast time to political
parties and allow them to decide upon a distributive method-
ology. See id. at 277-278.
94 See Kako, supra note 55, at 1300-1302 (discussing the
special problems of noncommercial stations and rejecting
Section 312(a)(7) access because the candidate's advocacy
constitutes "commercial").
95 See id. at 1302-1303, n.92 (discussing how the differen-
tiation between Federal and state and local candidates within
Section 312(a) (7) causes the state and local candidates to be
seriously disadvantaged when competing against candidates
elections. Again, such matters should be deter-
mined by Congress after significant inquiry.
The McCain-Feingold Bill seeks to reform the
financing of federal elections. 99 Title I of the pro-
posed legislation pertains to spending limits and
benefits in Senate elections. 10° The scope of the
bill, in its present form, provides for free broad-
cast time only for senatorial candidates. 10' If this
legislation is aimed only at specific problems
which exclusively or primarily involve campaigns
for the Senate, there may be a rational basis for
limiting the creation of new rights under the
Communications Act. However, Congress must
be mindful to consider Constitutional issues, in-
cluding the Equal Protection Clause, if it chooses
ultimately to pass this legislation and limit free
broadcasting time to Senate candidates.
The provisions of the McCain-Feingold Bill do
not directly involve Section 312(a) (7) of the Com-
munications Act in that it seeks to amend only
Section 315 of the Act by creating free broadcast-
ing rights for Senate candidates. However, assum-
ing the free broadcast provisions of this proposed
legislation survive lobbying efforts, further debate
and/or committee revision, Congress may wish to
consider expanding the scope of this legislation to
address the Section 312(a) (7) "reasonable access"
issue presented herein.
The McCain-Feingold Bill will not receive fur-
ther consideration during this session of Con-
gress. A Republican effort leg by Senator Trent
Lott of Mississippi, resulted in the removal of the
bill from the Senate floor pursuant to a proce-
dural tactic. 10 2 The broadcasting provisions of
the Bill were certainly overshadowed by issues
such as "soft money" political party donations and
interest group advocacy commercials. 103 It is
likely, however, that this Bill and/or its underly-
ing issues, will resurface during the next Congress
as its supporters have vowed to address the acts of
the opposition during this election year.
for federal office for access to a particular station).
96 But see id. at 1304-1306 (discussing the constitutional-
ity of Section 312(a) (7) under free speech rights).
97 See 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)( 7 ) (1934).
911 See id.
99 See generally S. 25, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997).
loo See il.
101 See id. § 102.
102 See David Rogers, Issues on Campaign Finance Reform




Are Politicians a Protected Class?
Politicians may be a protected class, in that they
represent or purport to represent the people and
voters of their constituencies. It is more demo-
cratic to provide both equal and reasonable access
to all qualified candidates so that their viewpoints
and positions may be heard and digested by the
voters. The opportunity now presents itself to re-
104 The McCain-Feingold Bill has provided for such con-
tingencies in its "severability" provision, which allow for the
survival of the remaining provisions of the Act should any
portion thereof be declared unconstitutional. See S. 25,
105th Cong., 1st Sess. § 501 (1997). In addition, this bill al-
visit the legislative decisions made over two de-
cades ago with respect to "reasonable access"
rights. Whether or not the scope of this pending
legislation is expanded, Congress should proceed
carefully and prudently from a Constitutional
standpoint when addressing the broadcasting
amendments of the McCain-Feingold Bill.
10 4
lows for an appeal directly to the United States Supreme
Court from any final judgment, decree or order issued by any
court ruling on the constitutionality of any of its provisions.
See id. § 502.
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